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This paper addresses two vital concerns in the debate on 
adaptation to climate change. First, how can countries 
prepare to manage the impact of climate-change induced 
natural disasters? Second, how can countries ensure 
that they have the governmental institutions required 
to manage the phenomenal challenge of adaptation to 
climate change? A range of economic and institutional 
measures are tested for their potential effects on natural 
disaster resilience and the quality of environmental 
governance. The findings suggest an important role is 
played by social and political institutions in determining 
the ability of countries to adapt to climate change and 
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respond to natural disasters, in particular in the degree to 
which countries have succeeded in gender empowerment 
and the development of a robust civil society and 
nonprofit sector. As the climate change challenge moves 
from that of “proving the facts” to that of “implementing 
change,” the authors suggest that international 
policymakers, donors, and activists must increasingly 
focus on building domestic policy environments that are 
conducive to the delivery of more effective environmental 
legislation, for example through implementation of 
gender quotas and provision of support to civil society 
groups. Social and Governance Dimensions of Climate Change: 













                                                 
1 foa@fas.harvard.edu. Department of Government, Harvard University, 1737 Cambridge Street, 
Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.  This paper was jointly commissioned by the World Bank’s Social 
Development Department and WDR Team as a background paper for the World Development Report 
2010: Development in a Changing Climate. The author is grateful for comments from Robin Mearns, 
Carolyn Turk, Susmita Dasgupta, Dominique van der Mensbrugge, and Urvashi Narain. The Stern Review has argued that climate change is the ‘greatest and widest ranging 
market failure ever seen’ (Stern et al. 2006). As a result of the emissions released by the 
past and present population of a subset of the world’s nations, future generations across 
the globe must bear the costs of climate change adaptation, regardless of their degree of 
responsibility. This is particularly the case among developing countries, whose per capita 
emissions remain low yet many of which face acute challenges with regard to phenomena 
such as desertification, rising sea levels, and the frequency of natural disasters. In order to 
meet such challenges, these countries are likely to require substantial donor aid from 
international development organizations in the years to come, as well as substantial 
technical assistance.  
 
One important aspect of adaptation cost is in the form of prevention and response to 
natural disasters – events involving dramatic though poorly anticipated geographic 
change such as floods, droughts, heat waves, earthquakes, and tsunamis. Natural disasters 
are responsible for thousands of deaths every year due to their direct impact on 
vulnerable communities, and millions of deaths every year due to their indirect effects via 
damage to health, sanitation, and irrigation infrastructure. Alterations in the climate, or 
‘climate change,’ will produce a higher degree of natural disasters, as these by definition 
are extreme weather events, where ‘extreme’ is defined in relation to human expectations 
and capacities. As low-income societies are increasingly faced with unexpected climatic 
phenomena, to which their infrastructure is poorly adapted, the rate of natural disasters is 
expected to increase in coming years. Between 1971 and 1995 these caused an average of 
128,000 deaths per year, affected 136 million people, and caused a total $439bn of 
damages; of those affected by natural hazards between 1971 and 1995, 99 per cent were 
individuals living in the global South (IFRC 1997).  
 
Section 1.0 of this paper begins by assessing the ability of countries to manage the costs 
of climate change adaptation, looking at success and failure at managing natural disasters 
- with ‘success’ defined in terms of a lower rate of deaths relative to the number of 
disasters faced by a society. In examining this issue, we use data published by the Centre 
for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters as part of their recently assembled EM-
DAT database (CRED 2004). As well as including economic and demographic variables 
(such as income per capita and population density), we assess the role of difference 
political and social institutions in determining the capacity of societies to respond 
effectively to the onset of natural disaster, using composite institutional indices 
developed within the World Bank. Specifically, we make use of the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, as measures of different dimensions of state effectiveness 
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Maastruzzi 2008), and the Indices of Social Development, as 
measures of such areas as intergroup cohesion and the density of civil society (World 
Bank 2008). 
 
Having examined the determinants of effectiveness at natural disaster management, 
Section 2.0 turns to the question of environmental governance – the success or failure of 
states at achieving climate change mitigation and adaptation tasks, such as limitation of 
emissions, improvements in air and water quality, recycling. Though analysts and 
policymakers have often simply taken for granted the willingness and ability of states to 
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neither government commitment to implementing such policies, nor the state capacity to 
see such policies through to their logical outcomes, can be assumed as given. This paper 
examines the ‘political economy’ of country climate change strategies, by presenting 
findings on cross-country variation in the seriousness and success of governments in 
responding to environmental management obligations. As measures of environmental 
governance, we take the Index of Environmental Sustainability (ESI) developed by Yale 
University (Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy) and Columbia University 
(Center for International Earth Science Information Network) in collaboration with the 
World Economic Forum and the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, and 
the Environmental Performance Index (EPI), by the same authors. Again, as independent 
variables we include economic and demographic controls, but additionally examine the 
impact of social institutions in determining the robustness of country responses to 
environmental challenges, in particular such factors such as the development of a robust 
and independent civil society, that is capable of highlighting failures in environmental 
stewardship and lobbying for improvements in policies directed to such ends. Once again, 
we find that social institutions are important in patterning the seriousness of countries in 
managing climate change challenges.  
 
Taken together, our findings suggests that as the climate change challenge moves from 
that of ‘proving the facts’ to that of ‘implementing change’, international policymakers, 
donors, and activists must increasingly focus on building domestic policy environments 
that are conducive to the delivery of more effective environmental legislation, and more 
comprehensive policy implementation on the ground level. In short, meeting the 
challenge of global climate change is likely to require substantial institutional capacity 
building, in addition to international development aid for projects directly aiming to 
achieve mitigation and adaptation goals.  
 
 
Section 1.0   Institutional Prerequisites of Natural Disaster Responsiveness 
 
 
Empirical Literature on the Determinants of Natural Disaster Responsiveness 
 
 
The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters has defined a natural disaster 
as a ‘situation or event which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to 
national or international level for external assistance; an unforeseen and often sudden 
event that causes great damage, destruction and human suffering’ (CRED 2004). Over the 
last several decades a considerable literature on such disasters has emerged from human 
geography, sociology, anthropology and economics (Mitchell 1999; Hewitt 1997; Blaikie 
et al. 1994; Varley 1994; Twigg and Bhatt 1998). Whereas early research on natural 
disaster risk arose from the natural sciences and stressed geographic and climatic factors 
as determinants of population risk, more recent work from within the approach known as 
‘vulnerability analysis’ asserts that for there to be a disaster there has to be not only a 
natural hazard, but also a vulnerable population. This has shifted the locus of research 
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density, poverty, and the existence of a free media and NGO sector. In a review of the 
more recent literature, Cannon (2000), for example, distinguishes five determinants of 
population vulnerability: Initial well-being, Livelihood Resilience, Self-protection, Social 
protection, and Social Capital. Initial well-being refers to the existing human and 
economic resources possessed by vulnerable population, and can be proxied by measures 
of prior life expectancy and income per capita. Livelihood resilience refers to the ability 
of the population to return to its previous set of activities, and depends in part on the 
nature of the catastrophe. Self-protection refers to the ability of the individual household 
to prepare in anticipation of eventual disaster, and can be proxied by measures of 
education and skills. Social protection in this context refers to the efficacy of political 
institutions in providing disaster relief support, and can be measured by indices of 
governance (Cannon 2000).  
 
In seeking to understand the vulnerability of populations to natural hazard risks, 
researchers are increasingly considering the institutional deficiencies which lead groups 
to become marginalized and then prevented from receiving an effective, organized 
disaster relief operation. As Nates and Moyer (2005) remark in a review of the causes of 
a range of recent natural disasters, ‘the poor outcome in many of these disasters is not the 
result of lack of knowledge but rather the result of inaction and poor implementation of 
the necessary measures to prevent, contain, or mitigate the impact of natural disasters on 
the populations exposed’. Alternatively put, the high impact of certain disasters reflects 
institutional failure, both in the preparation and in the response to the occurrence of an 
extreme hazard event.  
 
 
The Role of Formal and Informal Institutions in Natural Disaster Response 
 
Accordingly, this background paper seeks to shed further light upon the role of 
institutions in patterning readiness and responsiveness to natural disaster risks. Our 
approach follows North (1990) in defining these as the norms and conventions that 
pattern social behavior, ‘the rules of the game in a society [or] the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction’. Whereas formal institutions are rules enforced 
by third-party mechanisms, such as a police corps, judiciary, or constitutional council, 
social institutions generally rely upon tacit norms and expectations. Examples of informal 
institutions include the practice of signing petitions to protest a policy, joining a 
neighborhood watch group, or doing business with a member of a different ethnic group. 
These can be distinguished from formal institutions, examples of which include the 
requirement to put constitutional amendments to referendum, the power of judicial 
review, or the existence of legal sanctions against infringement of intellectual property 
rights. A visual summary is provided in Figure 1.0.  
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We can consider a wide range of reasons why formal institutions, or quality of 
governance, ought to matter for the capacity of states to respond to environmental hazard 
events. For example, Sen and Dreze (1989, 1995) have argued that a major contributor to 
population vulnerability with respect to famine is the degree of transparency in 
governance and freedom of the press. In countries where the media has been able to 
report the onset of famine without restrictions and where politicians have electoral 
incentives to prevent widespread hunger, potential famines are identified early and public 
interventions are made to support precarious groups and communities. Democratic 
government and civic rights should therefore facilitate adaptation to climate-induced 
risks.  We should find this effect to be particularly strong in the presence and 
organization of local and international NGOs, as such organizations provide an important 
informational role by monitoring and reporting on the degree of risk, as well as 
disbursing aid and assistance to affected groups (Martin and Taher 2001). 
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operations, as the neutrality, commitment, and effectiveness of the bureaucracy and 
military are crucial for ensuring swift delivery of food aid, population transfer from 
affected areas, as well as repair to damaged health, irrigation and transportation 
infrastructure. On the other hand, where local officials are corrupt, funds allocated by 
international donor organizations and central government agencies for disaster relief are 
likely to be diverted to private ends, and fail to be disbursed to the affected areas (Martin 
and Taher 2002).  
 
Besides quality of government, we should expect a range of informal institutions are also 
relevant to the capacity of vulnerable populations to withstand natural disaster risks. For 
example, several authors have highlighted the importance of ‘social capital’, understood 
as the ‘norms and networks that enable people to act collectively’ (Woolcock and 
Narayan 2000) upon the vulnerability of populations to climate risks. Where there are 
strong local community support networks, in theory people should be able to weather the 
impact of natural disasters better and be able to recover faster following the event, by 
pooling welfare risks and cooperating in reconstruction tasks. Adger (2003), for example, 
argues that social capital is an indispensable precondition to adapting to the effects of 
global climate change, citing the example of successful adaptation in protecting marine 
areas in Trinidad and Tobago (Brown et al. 2001, Brown, Tompkins and Adger 2002, 
Tompkins, Adger and Brown 2002).  
 
Finally, a growing literature focuses on the nature of social institutions, not only within 
the community, but also within the household. Neumayer and Plümper (2007), for 
example, provide the latest in a range of studies showing a distinctly gendered pattern to 
natural disaster impact, and that natural disasters lower the life expectancy of women 
more than that of men. They also show that in societies where women have higher socio-
economic status (SES), this effect is less, and therefore that the overall effect of natural 
disaster upon mortality rates is reduced. The implication is that norms of gender inclusion 





As a measure of success and failure at managing the effects of climate change, we take 
the rate of deaths from natural disaster events – that is, the per capita number of deaths 
arising from floods, heat-waves, tsunami, and earthquakes – for the period 1995-2005. 
Our source for this measure is the EM-DAT database published by the World Health 
Organization (WHO 2008), a joint project with the Centre for Research on Epidemiology 
of Disasters (CRED) at the Catholic University of Louvain in Belgium, which records all 
events where either 10 people were killed; 100 people were reported affected; there was a 
call for international assistance; or declaration of a state of emergency. The data used 
covers the period from 1995-2005, inclusive, from which a single measure is constructed 
taking an average across the entire decade. In addition, to further ensure that the 
regression is robust to the inclusion of any individual outlier (high impact disaster) cases, 
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2. A 
summary of the numbers of deaths, by event type and by region, can be found in Table 
1.0.  
 
We measure the quality of formal institutions using the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, released annually by the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay and Maastruzzi 
2008). The Worldwide Governance Indicators are a set of six composite indices compiled 
using an unobserved components model based on over 300 items and over 30 data 
sources, and serve to track the functioning of basic qualities of the state such as the 
transparency of political processes or the quality of the bureaucracy. From the six indices 
compiled annually by the project, we include measures for Voice and Accountability, 
Government Effectiveness and Control of Corruption. The Voice and Accountability 
measure is an index of the degree of citizen involvement in public decision-making 
through elections and civic rights; the Government Effectiveness measure is an index of 
the quality of the bureaucracy and its efficiency in delivering public goods and services; 
the Control of Corruption measure is an index of the extent to which public officials use 
their position for private gain, for example through bribes, extortion, and embezzlement 
(Kaufmann and Kraay 1999). 
 
Finally, we measure informal institutions using the Indices of Social Development (ISD), 
developed within the Social Development Department of the World Bank (World Bank 
2008). The Indices of Social Development combine 200 items, from some 25 sources, 
into five social institutional clusters: gender equity, intergroup cohesion, interpersonal 
safety and trust, clubs and associations, and civic activism. For each cluster, items are 
combined using a latent variables approach, as adopted in the generation of the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators and Transparency International’s Corruptions 
Perceptions Index (Kaufmann et al 1999, 2007; Lambsdorff 2006). The intuition behind 
these procedures is that each set of indicators represents some implicit value of the 
underlying phenomenon in each society, on differing scales, with differing country 
samples, and with varying degrees of measurement error. The first cluster, gender equity, 
estimates levels of discrimination against women, and includes data on health, 
educational, and wage-related gender disparities, as well as data on the norms of 
discrimination that sustain these over time, such as the proportion of managers who 
believe men have more right to a job than women, or the proportion of parents who 
believe that boys should be prioritised in access to education. The second area, inter-
group cohesion, reflects the extent of social conflict among ethnic, religious, or other 
social identity groups, using data on overt conflict, such as ratings on the level of ethnic 
and religious tensions, or the number of riots, assassinations, and acts of terrorism. The 
third area, interpersonal safety and trust, is an enhanced measure of general social trust, 
and brings together standard social trust items with data on the “trustworthiness” of 
others, based on criminal and related activity. The fourth area, clubs and associations 
measures the level of engagement in local associations and networks. Strength of 
community is measured using data on levels of engagement in local voluntary 
                                                 
2 Regressions models were also estimated using the raw (untransformed) rate of deaths from natural 
disasters. However, in these models no variables emerge as significant due to the leveraging effect of 
outliers. 
  7associations, time spent socializing in community groups, and membership of 
developmental organizations. Finally, the fifth area is the level of civic activism, which 
measures the extent to which social practices encourage a more active and critical 
interaction with political authorities. The strength of civil society is measured using 
survey data on participation in civic activities such as petitions or marches, access to 
media through newspaper and radio, and the density of international civil society 
organizations







The equation to be estimated is given by: 
 
 
(1) lnDEATHi  =   + 1INSTi + 2lnDISASTERSi + 3lnPOPi + 4lnPOPDENSi +  
 5GDPi + 6GDP
2
i + 7lnDISASTERS*GDP i  + ei 
 
 
Where DEATH is the rate of deaths from natural disasters and INST is an indicator of 
formal or informal institutions. In addition we include a number of control variables: 
DISASTERS is the number of disasters which occurred during the decade, POP is 
population, POPDENS is population density, GDP is GDP per capita measured in 
international dollars, e is the country-specific error term and i is country i. We also 
include an interactive term DISASTERS*GDP, in recognition of the fact that the impact 
of the number of natural disasters may vary according to the level of GDP per capita, and 
in particular that poor countries may be vulnerable to a higher frequency of hazard 
events. To avoid potential problems with multicollinearity, we include only one of the 
institutional measures at a time; a final model is included using an interaction between 
Voice and Accountability and Civic Activism, reflecting the hypothesis that the effect of 
participative institutions on disaster responsiveness is likely to be greater in societies with 
well-organized NGO sectors
4. Finally, in order to overcome potential endogeneity 
between natural disaster and our independent variables, all the independent variables are 
lagged to 1995
5. Our models therefore test the ability of a range of variables to predict 
the rate of deaths from natural disasters over the course of the subsequent decade.  
                                                
 
 
3 Civic activism differs from measures of formal political institutions, such as the democracy measure 
produced as part of the Polity dataset, as it measures the specifically social practices and norms that ‘make 
democracy work’. These informal institutions include a high level of civic informedness regarding political 
debates and policies, a willingness among citizens to express their views through civic forums such as 
community meetings or the press, and mobilisation to place pressure on officials to deliver better public 
services, for example via protest or petition. Studies such as Putnam et al. (1993) have identified these 
practices as essential for maintaining government efficacy, in addition to the existence of formal rules such 
as elections and constitutional guarantees of civil liberties, which are captured by the Voice and 
Accountability measure from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
4 A correlation matrix between the social institutional variables in provided in Table 2.0. 
5 The governance indicators are lagged to 1996, the first year for which estimates exist. 
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Results 
 
The results of these regressions are shown in Table 3.0. Our findings can be summarized 
as follows: 
 
First, intergroup cohesion is very significantly associated with effective disaster 
relief. In societies with pervasive tensions between ethnic and religious groups, the rate 
of deaths from natural disasters is substantially elevated (Figure 2.0). The coefficient for 
intergroup cohesion of –7.663 implies that a one standard deviation improvement on this 
measure would result in a 0.95 fall in the log rate of natural disaster deaths, or a fall from 
the maximum recorded rate of deaths in the sample of 8,900 per 100,000 (registered by 
Indonesia), to a much lower level of 3,441 per 100,000. The p-value of 0.000 implies a 
very low likelihood of this finding being due to random error. Examination of the 
residual plot shows no evidence of individual cases leveraging the result. The strong 
association between intergroup tensions and death from natural disasters may be due to 
several factors. First, in societies where ethnic and sectarian tensions lead to conflict or 
partial secession, government agencies and humanitarian organizations face great 
difficulties in disbursing emergency relief due to the precarious security situation. 
Second, poor inter- and intra-community relations may also affect the recovery process, 
as conflict-ridden communities fail to achieve the coordination required in order to 
manage the post-crisis challenges
6. Third, the onset of a natural disaster may exacerbate 
existing tensions and stimulate the outbreak of conflict. As a result, fragile states and 
conflict-affected regions are especially at risk of the consequences of climate change. 
 
Second, participative governance increases the effectiveness of disaster relief - but 
only in the presence of a robust civil society. The coefficients in Model (ix) for Voice 
and Accountability, Civic Activism, and their interactive term imply that among 
democracies (countries with a Voice and Accountability score of 1.5) a one standard-
deviation increase in the level of civic activism results in a 1.019 fall in the log rate of 
natural disaster deaths, or a fall from the maximum recorded rate of deaths in the sample 
of 8,900 per 100,000 (registered by Indonesia), to a much lower level of 3,214 per 
100,000. However, this effect diminishes to zero among polities whose score on Voice 
and Accountability approximates the global mean. Both democratic institutions and a 
democratic culture, characterized by a high density of civic organizations and norms of 
political activism, are required in order to ensure prompt, efficient, and accountable 
government responses to disaster risk management. Civil society organizations cannot 
operate effectively under authoritarian regimes, yet neither can democratic institutions 
deliver unless a civil society exists capable of monitoring the public use of funds and 
pressuring politicians into action (Putnam 1993, Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  
 
 
                                                 
6 Research has shown strong linkages from ethnic fractionalization to poor governance outcomes in the 
form of clientelism, corruption and reduced government effectiveness (Alesina et al. 2003), though 
admittedly the coefficients for the governance variables are not significant when included individually in 
these regressions, suggesting a direct effect from social institutions to natural disaster vulnerability. 
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Figure 2.0: Partial Correlation (Residual Plot) between Intergroup Cohesion and 








































































Third, gender equity is significantly associated with country resilience to natural 
disasters. In accordance with earlier work on the effect of women’s empowerment on 
natural disaster recovery, the coefficient for Gender Equity is significant in reducing the 
rate of deaths. Policies designed to improve women’s education and eliminate 
discrimination in work, family, and public life ensure women are not made to suffer 
disproportionately the consequences of natural disaster (Neumayer and Plümper 2007), 
and are able to play an effective role in securing the wellbeing of themselves and their 
children, following a disaster event. 
 
  10Fourth, larger states (measured by log population) suffer a higher rate of deaths 
from natural disaster than smaller states
7. The average coefficient for (log) population 
of -3.06 implies that a state with population of 60m and the mean death rate of 15 per 
100,000, would, all else equal, experience a 248 per 100,000 rate were its population 
150m. Examination of the residual plot shows that this is not a finding leveraged by a 
single outlier, but by a number of cases, which include India, China, Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, and the Russian Federation (see Figure 3.0)
8. 
 
Why should large states be less apt at managing natural disasters? A tentative 
interpretation of this finding can be advanced in terms of political economy: larger states 
are less responsive to natural disaster events, as the discrepancy between the unit of 
impact (a region or group of cities) and the unit for which the government is responsible 
(the entire country) is greater. In large states, this lower incidence between the unit of 
government and the impact of the natural disaster reduces the ability and the incentive of 
the state and its disaster relief agencies to respond promptly and effectively to the disaster 
incident. After all, many emergency relief agencies and mechanisms, such as the army or 
civil service, are controlled by central government rather than by local authorities. This 
relationship appears to hold among both developed and developing nations. Thus among 
high income countries, the United States has the highest number of deaths per capita 
(due, in this time period, to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina); states with the lowest per 
capita rate of death, by contrast, are almost all small countries such as Iceland, Ireland, or 
Norway. Likewise, among low and medium income nations the countries with the highest 
rate of death in natural disaster are disproportionately the large states, such as China, 
India, and Indonesia, while a number of small low-income states fare as well as their 
counterparts in Western Europe. It may thus be that where the unit of impact and the unit 
of governance are convergent, states may be more likely to react effectively to natural 
disasters, whereas when the unit of governance and the impact zone of the disaster event 
are not convergent, governments may be slower and less effective in their disaster 
response. This finding remains tentative, though may have important implications for the 
impact of such institutional reforms as devolution upon state capacity to address extreme 
climatic events. 
                                                 
7 This is not simply an artifact arising from the transformations applied to the data. Indeed, when the log 
transformation on both the dependent and independent variables is removed, the effect becomes far more 
significant. In our sample of data, larger states simply seem to have a higher rate of death from natural 
disaster than smaller ones. 
8 After removing any combination of the ‘large’ developing countries (India, China, Russia, Bangladesh, 
Indonesia) from the model, we find that the coefficient for log population remains significant at the 0.001 
level. 
  11Figure 3.0: Partial Correlation (Residual Plot) between country size (log population) 










































































Fifth, our results show that income per capita is significantly positively associated 
with a lower rate of deaths from natural disasters, though the squared term is 
signed in the opposite direction. Substantively interpreted, this means that there are 
rapidly diminishing marginal returns to economic development. Beyond income per 
capita of $5,000 at purchasing power parity, the effect of further growth on natural 
disaster resilience slows, and beyond $10,000 further change is incremental. To put these 
figures in perspective, the estimated effect of moving from GDP per capita of $1,000 to 
$5,000, is the same as the effect of moving from $5,000 to $30,000. Advancing from a 
lower to medium-income economy reduces substantially the level of vulnerability to 
natural disaster, but beyond this point further economic development has little or no 
positive effect in reducing the rate of deaths. The fact that citizens of high income 
economies have lower risk of death from natural disasters is to be explained, not by their 
relative affluence, but by the better governance and more robust social institutions to be 
found in such cases.  
 
  12Sixth, poorer states are more vulnerable to the frequency of natural disasters than 
are wealthier states, as shown by the coefficient for the interactive effect between (log) 





The findings reported in the above section might lead us to suggest the following 
conclusions. Our findings on gender are in line with those reported by Neumayer and 
Plümper (2007) regarding differences in male-female mortality rates following natural 
disasters. We are able to reaffirm their conclusion that universal female education, as 
well as legislation to empower women in the home, politically, and in the labor market, 
can help to make societies more resilient to the onset of natural disaster. 
 
Second, our findings suggest a very important priority for conflict resolution and 
reconciliation in ongoing and post-conflict countries. Overcoming natural disasters 
requires collective action: where the institutions allowing collective action are severely 
deficient, as is the case in societies riven by intercommunal conflict, and even the partial 
secession of a region of the country, societies are acutely vulnerable.  
 
Third, the regression coefficients suggest polities may be more resilient if they devolve 
political responsibility for natural disaster response to lower units of government, though 
of course, devolution does not substitute perfectly for having a smaller state. Exactly 
which level to devolve to may be difficult to determine precisely, as there is a trade-off 
between resource mobilization (easier to achieve at higher units of government) and the 
incentive to address the crisis (stronger at lower levels of government).  
 
Fourth, we confirm at the cross-country level the famous hypothesis made by Sen and 
Dreze (1989, 1995) regarding the relationship between democracy and natural disaster 
vulnerability, though refine their argument in an important fashion. The mere existence of 
elections and constitutional rights is not in itself enough to ensure effective public 
response to disasters, if these are not supplemented by civic networks and associations 
capable of making democracy work. Indeed, the interaction term in our model implies 
that such fragile democracies perform worse than stable authoritarian regimes, though 
neither is as effective in natural disaster response as effective democracies combining 
representative institutions with engaged civic actors. Meanwhile, our results imply that 
attempts at bolstering civil society in authoritarian states are unlikely to deliver positive 
changes unless accompanied by genuine political reform allowing such groups to operate 
critically and independently. 
 
Finally, also important to note are those institutions which are not significantly associated 
with natural disaster vulnerability. As with Chase and Labonne (2008), we fail to find a 
direct link from the strength of close or ‘bonding’ ties (such as within a family or 
community) to the ability to withstand external shocks - but ‘bridging’ ties, such as 
between ethnic groups, between men and women, or between domestic and international 
civil society actors, do appear to enhance resilience. The ability to withstand shock events 
  13depends upon the ability to mobilize resources from outside the affected group, and 
where these ties are absent groups stand particularly vulnerable.  
 
 
Section 2.0   Toward Better Environmental Governance  
 
Research thus far suggests an important role is played by institutions in determining the 
readiness of countries to withstand the shocks associated with climate change. In this 
section, we broaden our enquiry to examine the institutional preconditions of 
‘environmental governance’ a concept than encompasses not merely the capacity to adapt 
to climate change induced shocks, but also the management of natural resource 
endowments, past and present pollution levels, environmental management efforts, 
contributions to protection of the global commons, and a society's capacity to improve its 
environmental performance over time (YCELP 2005).  
 
Why do some countries have higher levels of environmental sustainability than others? In 
answering this question, this section of the background paper draws from the findings of 
Dulal, Foa and Knowles (2008), in which the authors test for significant associations 
between recent measures of environmental governance and the quality of social and 
political institutions.  
 
 
Previous Literature on Social Institutions and Environmental Governance 
 
Previous studies have proven inclusive regarding its institutional preconditions of 
environmental governance. Grafton and Knowles (2004) analyze the relationship between 
social capital and national environmental performance for a sample of 35 countries, with 
their data sample being made up largely of high-income countries. Their social capital 
data are taken from the third wave of the World Values Survey (Inglehart et al. 2000). 
They employ three different proxies of social capital: WVSTRUST, WVSCIVIC and 
WVSASSOC. WVSTRUST measures the proportion of the population who answer “most 
people can be trusted” to the question ‘generally speaking do you think that most people 
can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’ WVSCIVIC is an 
index measuring the extent to which people think certain behaviors (such as cheating on 
your taxes, or avoiding a fare on public transport, if you had the chance) can be justified. 
WVSASSOC measures the extent of membership of different voluntary groups (such as 
church or religious groups and sports clubs). These social capital proxies were first used 
in cross-country empirical work by Knack and Keefer (1997), in the context of explaining 
cross-country differences in the rate of economic growth. 
 
Grafton and Knowles find a significant negative correlation between both WVSTRUST 
and WVSASSOC and the ESI, which is counter to expectations, but a significant positive 
correlation between WVSCIVIC and the ESI. Grafton and Knowles also analyze the 
relationship between what they term ‘public social capital’ and the environment. Public 
social capital is proxied by a measure of democratic accountability and a measure of the 
extent of corruption, though both proxies are generally insignificant. Of the other control 
  14variables they include (such as income per capita, measures of ethnic and religious 
diversity and population density), only population density (with a negative sign) and 
income per capita (with a positive sign) are significant in the majority of specifications. 
Grafton and Knowles (2004, p.366) argue that their ‘findings provide very little empirical 
support for the hypothesis that higher levels of social capital and related variables 
improve cross-national environmental quality’ but note that these results should be 
regarded as preliminary. It may be that empirical specifications of social capital have 
failed to identify the correct institutions: and in particular, given the strong association 
between WVSCIVIC and the ESI, that an excessive focus has been placed on ‘social’ 
norms such as trust or community life, rather than ‘sociopolitical’ institutions such as 
civil society organization and activism.  
 
A related literature analyses the effect of democracy on cross-country environmental 
outcomes. It is possible that in a democracy citizens are more informed about 
environmental issues (due to freedom of the press, for example) and can express their 
preferences regarding environmental issues at the ballot box (Payne, 1995). In addition, 
to the extent that environmental issues often have a long-run focus, and that autocratic 
leaders are more short-sighted than the median voter, democracies may enjoy better 
environmental outcomes than non-democracies (Congleton, 1992). A counter argument 
would be that democratic leaders are often only elected for a few years, while autocratic 
leaders stay on for decades, thus the incentive would be for the unaccountable democratic 
leader to make a quick profit by selling natural resources before they are voted out of 
office – a version of the tragedy of the commons.  On the other hand, to the extent that 
democracy is associated with free market economies with little regulation, this may lead 
to market failures which place pressure on the environment (Neumayer, 2002). Contrary 
to this, western liberal democracy tends to be associated with clearer and more stable 
property rights, leading to greater incentives for protection and sustainable use of natural 
resources.  Hence, in theory, democracy could have either a positive or negative effect on 
environmental performance. 
 
Previous empirical work on the relationship between democracy and the environment 
across countries is inconclusive, with measures of democracy being positive in some 
studies and negative in others. There is some evidence that whether democracy has a 
positive, negative or insignificant effect depends on which environmental outcomes are 
being explained. Midlarsky (1998) finds a significant negative correlation between 
democracy and CO2 emissions and soil erosion by both water and deforestation, but a 
significant positive relationship between protected land area and democracy. Neumayer 
(2002) finds a significant positive correlation between democracy and environment 
commitment (as proxied by whether countries have signed multilateral environmental 
agreements). Frederiksson et al (2005) find that the number of environmental lobby 
groups has a negative effect on the lead content of gasoline, but only in countries with a 
high degree of political competition (as proxied by the percentage of votes not going to 
the ruling party). Scruggs (1999) finds an index of corporatist political institutions and 
environmental group membership to be significantly positively correlated with an index 
of environmental outcomes for a sample of 17 industrialised countries. Torras and Boyce 
(1998) find that countries with higher levels of political and civil liberties tend to have 
  15lower emissions of a number of pollutants, especially in low-income countries. The 
findings regarding democracy and civil society suggest that the institutional preconditions 
of environmental governance are complex, and that only in particular contexts – such as 
the existence of a well-organized, informed civil society – do participative political 
institutions deliver a higher quality of environmental governance.  
 
 
The Relationship between Social Institutions and the Environment 
 
If the empirical links from institutions to environmental governance remain ambiguous, 
the theoretical links are better established. In this section of the paper we present 
arguments as to why higher quality social institutions may be beneficial for 





A growing literature supports the view that societies with greater gender inclusion may 
achieve better environmental outcomes. Especially in rural areas of developing countries, 
rural women depend on communal resources for subsistence needs, due to the lack of 
access to private land, employment, and other productive assets (Agrawal, 1994). Prasal 
et al (1987) attribute this close relationship to necessity. Based on their four village study 
in rural Nepal, they report that women have a more responsible attitude towards forests 
than men because it plays an important role in their daily lives. As female children and 
women are responsible for collecting firewood and fodder, additional hardship they and 
their children would face as a result of depleted forests would motivate them to become 
more responsible than their male counterparts. Thus, the division of labor within the 
household and women’s responsibility towards procuring resources such as water, fuel 
and wood, make women both more dependent on common property resources and at the 
same time more vulnerable to the negative externalities of natural resource degradation 
(Manion, 2002). Forest protection movements such as “Chipko”, in what is now known 
as the Uttarakhand Hills in India, in which women play a major role, confirm women do 
understand vulnerabilities and can mobilize and demonstrate in favor of environmental 
protection, if needed (Karan, 1994).  
 
Molinas (1998) in an empirical study drawing on data from 104 peasant cooperatives in 
Paraguay, finds that the degree of cooperation within these cooperatives increases with 
the level of female membership. Turning to groups concerned specifically with the 
environment, Westermann et al. (2005) compare the performance of 46 natural resource 
management (NRM) groups across 20 countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia. They 
find that women’s groups tend to behave more collaboratively and have greater capacity 
to sustain collective action than groups made up entirely of men, or mixed groups 
containing both men and women.  
 
Turning to evidence from the experimental economics literature, Andersen et al (2008) 
play a public goods game in three different regions in India, and find that fewer people 
  16free ride in regions where women are more empowered. Differences in the extent of free 
riding were greater across regions (with different levels of female empowerment) than 
they were between men and women within the same region.
 9 This is an important 
finding, as it suggests that studies using micro-level data on individuals from the same 
region will fail to identify the full effect of female empowerment on environmental 
issues. Cross-regional or cross-country studies may be more informative about this 
relationship.  
The arguments summarized above suggest that women may be more conscious of 
environmental issues than men. If this is true, then we would expect that excluding 
women from full participation in decision making will have a negative effect on 
environmental measures.  
 
 
Trust, Cooperative Norms and Reciprocity  
 
People are more likely to act in the common interest when they have a high degree of 
trust in others. Even the slightest doubt in the mind of people that others in their 
community are not trustworthy will result in the breakdown of cooperative norms, 
including those with respect to the environment. High degrees of trust and cooperation 
also reduce transactions costs, making it easier to resolve collective action problems. 
 
Katz (2000) details a number of informal rules and norms that have evolved to govern the 
use of communally owned forests in the Western Highlands region of Guatemala. For 
example, many communities allow members the unrestricted right to gather fallen trees 
and branches for firewood, as long as the wood is only for the use of their family, but the 
felling of a live tree requires the authorization of a local committee. The existence of such 
norms presupposes either a high degree of trust that others will adhere to these norms, or 
sanctions against those who fail to adhere to the norms. The trust required for cooperative 
norms to be sustained may well be the result of intergroup cohesion, which may itself 
result from the density of local networks. 
 
 
Possibilities for Collective Action  
 
Theoretically, given that most environmental resources are common property resources, 
their sustainable use and protection requires collective action.  That is, one would expect 
a priori that communities with higher quality institutions that promote collective action 
would do better on environmental management.  This theoretical argument is supported 
by micro-evidence. For example, based on case studies in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, Isham 
(2002) demonstrates that differences in social capital can explain differences in indicators 
of environmental quality, such as access to clean water, and suggests that investment in 
social capital should be considered alongside potential investment in physical and human 
                                                 
9 Experiments which focus on whether females contribute more to the public good than males from the 
same region typically find little or no difference between the genders (see Croson and Gneezy, 2008, for a 
review of this literature). 
  17capital during the planning of development projects. Also in Sri Lanka, research by 
Uphoff and Wijayaratna (2000) shows that cooperation between rural farmers over 
sharing access to water can lead to an increase in agricultural yield even in the drought 
season.  
 
Gebremedhin et al. (2003) empirically demonstrate that connectedness in the community, 
in the sense of the extent to which members of the community interact with each other, 
plays an important role in redressing resource degradation and increasing community 
wealth. Katz (2000) finds that open access resources are much better managed in the 
Western Highlands region of Guatemala, where she argues social capital is high, than in 
the El Petén region, where the level of social capital is lower. She suggests (p.121) that 
“where social capital exists among natural resource users, it fosters a sense of ownership 
and respect for boundaries, and provides the foundation for use rules, monitoring, and 
enforcement mechanisms which helps preserve the natural resource base. In contrast, an 
absence of social capital in a situation where property rights is poorly defined can lead to 
resource mining in both private and common property regimes.”  
 
As argued above, clubs and associations and civic activism capture the contribution of 
social institutions to the possibility of collective action. When there is a high degree of 
engagement with the local community, be it through formal or informal networks, this is 
likely to make it easier to resolve collection action problems, such as the management of 
common property resources or internalizing externalities that are localized in nature. 




Data Used and the Empirical Model 
 
In order to measure the determinants of environmental governance, our measures of 
environmental policy effectiveness are the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI), 
developed by Yale University (Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy) and 
Columbia University (Center for International Earth Science Information Network) in 
collaboration with the World Economic Forum and the Joint Research Centre of the 
European Commission, and the Environmental Performance Index (EPI), developed by 
the same authors. The Environmental Sustainability Index is a composite index tracking 
21 elements of environmental sustainability covering natural resource endowments, past 
and present pollution levels, environmental management efforts, contributions to 
protection of the global commons, and a society's capacity to improve its environmental 
performance over time (YCELP 2005). Whereas the ESI was developed to evaluate 
environmental sustainability relative to the paths of other countries, the EPI uses 
outcome-oriented indicators, working as a benchmark index that can be more easily used 
by policy makers, environmental scientists, advocates and the general public (YCELP 
2008).  
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(2) ENVGOVi =  + 1SOCi + 2INDUSTi + 3lnPOPDENSi + 4VOICEi + 5GDPi + 6GDP
2
i + ei 
 
 
Where ENVGOV is the measure of environmental governance and SOC is an indicator of 
social institutions. In addition we include a number of control variables: INDUST is the 
share of industry in GDP, POPDENS is population density, VOICE is a measure of the 
extent of democracy, using the Worldwide Governance Indicator for Voice and 
Accountability, GDP is GDP per capita measured in international dollars, e is the 
country-specific error term and i is country i. Full definitions of all variables, and 
information on data sources, are given in the appendix. To avoid potential problems with 
multicolinearity, we include only one of the five social institutional measures at a time.  
 
Our dependent variables are the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) for 2005, and 
the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) for 2006
10. Our choice of control variables is 
largely guided by past cross-country empirical work on environmental outcomes (see, for 
example, Grafton and Knowles, 2004; Midlarsky, 1998). GDP and GDP
2 are included to 
control for the possibility of an environmental Kuznets curve. The environmental 
Kuznets curve hypothesis posits that there is an inverted-U relationship between 
environmental degradation and income per capita (see, for example, Dasgupta et al, 2002; 
Torras and Boyce, 1998), implying a U-shaped relationship between income per capita 
and the ESI/EPI. It also seems likely that countries that are more densely populated are 
likely to suffer from more environmental pressure, all else equal. Hence, we include the 
log of population density as a control variable. We also include industry value added as a 
share of GDP to control for the possibility that industrial activity places more pressure on 





The empirical results obtained from OLS estimation of equation (2) are reported in 
Tables 4.0 and 5.0, with each column of the table including a different social institutions 
measure. Table 4.0 reports the results for the ESI, and Table 5.0 for the EPI. Preliminary 
testing suggested some problems with heteroskedasticity, hence the t-statistics reported 
are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, following White (1980). Civic 
Activism and Gender Equity are both statistically significant in either table, with the 
expected positive sign. The remaining three social institutions indicators are all 
statistically insignificant.  
 
Turning to the results for the other control variables, population density is negative and 
significant at the one percent level in all specifications, confirming that densely populated 
countries tend to have poor environmental outcomes, all else equal. The democracy 
variable is also positive and significant in all specifications, suggesting more democratic 
                                                 
10 2006 is the first year for which the EPI has been produced. 
  19countries have higher levels of environmental sustainability, all else equal. GDP and 
GDP
2 are nearly always insignificant, suggesting there is no evidence of an 
environmental Kuznets curve. The share of industry in GDP is only significant at the ten 
percent level, when Clubs and Associations is the social institutions proxy. The R
2 ranges 
from 0.537 to 0.564, depending on which of the social institutions measures are included. 
Hence, approximately half of the cross-country variation in the ESI can be explained by 
the variables included in our regression model. 
 
Turning to the EPI (Table 5.0), we can see that the coefficients for population density and 
democracy (proxied using the Voice and Accountability indicator) are no longer 
significant. We might expect that population density would not be associated with 
environmental performance in the same way that it is associated with environmental 
sustainability, though no simple interpretation can be given of the loss of the democracy 
coefficient. However, once again civic activism and gender equity are significantly 
positively associated with a more robust record of environmental governance.  
 
The two tables of results discussed above imply that some forms of social institutions are 
significantly correlated with environmental performance, whereas others are not. The 
positive correlation between Gender Equity and both ESI and EPI may be evidence that 
women tend to be more protective of the environment than are men, which means that in 
countries where women have a greater say in society this is associated with better 
environmental performance. Based on the coefficients on Gender Equity from Table 4.0, 
a one standard deviation increase in Gender Equity is associated with an increase in the 
ESI of 1.96 percentage points. 
 
Turning to Civic Activism (see figure 4.0), this measure of social institutions was 
statistically significant with a positive sign whether ESI or EPI was the dependent 
variable. A significant positive correlation on Civic Activism implies that the ESI will be 
higher in countries where citizens are engaged in the political process, having controlled 
for whether a country is an electoral democracy or not, though of course the evidence 
suggests that democratic government helps foster civic networks and activities over time 
(Bernhard and Karakoç 2007). Based on the Table 4.0 results, a one standard deviation 





















































































The level of electoral democracy is significantly positively correlated with the ESI in 
virtually all regressions run. In column (i) of Table 4.0, both Civic Activism and 
democracy are statistically significant with positive point estimates. This implies that 
both whether a country is democratic (as measured by the Voice and Accountability 
index) and the extent to which individuals engage with the political process (as measured 




Institutions and Climate Change Mitigation 
 
If institutions have any role in bringing about improved environmental governance, this 
should imply some observable association, over time, between the presence of certain 
norms and concrete indicators of environmental performance. We can examine further 
whether such an association is observable, by taking data on reductions in carbon 
intensity (the ratio of gross domestic product to carbon emissions) over time.  
 
  21Table 6.0 presents the results of a series of regressions with the change in carbon 
intensity from 1995 to 2005 (whereby 1995 = 1.00), and as our independent variables a 
range of controls and institutional variables lagged to the start of the period (1995).  
 
These regressions indicate that short-term (one-decade) changes in carbon intensity are 
determined by a number of omitted variables and/or stochastic variation, as shown by the 
low coefficients of determination (r-squared) for these models, which range from 0.02 to 
0.19. Given this, we must be careful not to make undue inferences from the coefficients.  
 
This said, the most striking finding is the very significant positive association between 
gender equity and reductions in carbon intensity. A priori, this may be due to one of two 
reasons. First, the particular role of female legislators and decision-makers regarding 
environmental policy, discussed in the above section on gender participation. Second, the 
role that gender empowerment may have in encouraging economic growth through the 
expansion of the (more carbon neutral) service sector
11. In addition, it is also possible, 
given the high estimated error term, that the gender equity variable is collinear with an 
omitted determinant of carbon intensity, such that the association is spurious. However, 
examination of component-plus-residual plot for the gender term in this regression 
(figure 5.0) does not yield any clear suggestions as to what such a confounding variable 
might be.  
 
For example, one alternative hypothesis might be that oil-producing states in the Middle 
East are responsible for the effect, as these societies are low on gender equity yet high on 
carbon intensity. However, examination of the residual plot does not confirm this 
interpretation: while Middle Eastern oil producers are generally very low with respect to 
gender equity, there is no clear pattern regarding changes in carbon intensity: some states 
(Saudi Arabia, Sudan) have increased their carbon intensity of GDP, yet others (Algeria, 
United Arab Emirates) have seen substantial reductions. Another hypothesis is that the 
association is due to the coincidence of high gender equity in transitional (post-
communist) economies, where the industrial sector shrunk very rapidly during the 1990s. 
This association is accurate, yet the coefficient is also driven by other cases: this includes 
most states in Western Europe and North America. The link between gender equity and 
falling carbon intensity therefore may reflect some aspect of the extent to which women’s 
employment reflects more carbon neutral, service sector jobs, the growth of which sector 




                                                 
11 A reverse causal path from expansion of the service sector toward higher scores on gender equity is less 
likely however, as while service sector expansion may indeed encourage greater female employment, the 
index of gender equity is primarily composed by non-labor market indicators, such as gender disparities in 
health and education, levels of gender-based violence, and the prevalence of discriminatory attitudes. 
  22Figure 5.0  Partial Correlation (Residual Plot) between Gender Equity (1995) and 






































































































Social and Governance Dimensions of Climate Change: Implications for Policy 
 
 
Much of the discussion in the early climate change literature, and more recently within 
the public debate, has focused on the science of climate change. However, as the 
discussion has moved from ‘proving the facts’ to implementing mitigation and adaptation 
policies, it has become increasingly important to be conscious of the political economy of 
climate change decisions - both in terms of the factors which determine the willingness of 
political elites to implement mitigation and adaptation policies, and in terms of the ability 
of the state to then put into effect such policies.  
 
This paper makes a modest contribution to the ongoing analysis of the social and political 
contexts in which states act so as to reduce the negative environmental impact of their 
economic activities. The results of the cross-country regressions presented in this 
document are not to be considered as definitive, but do suggest a number of hypotheses 
regarding the causal determinants of proactive environmental policy. We find that 
variation across countries appears to be broad, wide-ranging across several policy 
measures, and systematic. 
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First, the results suggest that ‘democracy’ in itself is not a sufficient precondition for 
either good environmental policy, or effective response to climate-change induced 
disasters. Democracies can be effective where civil society groups are able to highlight 
abuses of authority and represent citizen interests, but can be unresponsive where small 
groups are able to capture the policy process. Instead, development practitioners ought to 
focus instead on the conditions in which participative government can work more 
effectively toward climate change responses; the results in this paper suggest that 
democracies function best where there is a strong and robust independent civil society 
(section 1), and that the empowerment of women ensures better environmental 
governance, better response to (climate change induced) disasters, and a better track 
record in achieving climate change mitigation objectives through a lower carbon intensity 
of GDP (section 2). Suggested policy outcomes based on these inferences would include 
quotas for women’s parliamentary representation, and ‘gender development,’ in the sense 
of achieving more comprehensive and universal educational enrollment among females.   
 
Second, while we find that certain social institutions matter, we do not find strong 
evidence that traditional conceptions of ‘social capital’ - understood simply in terms of 
engagement in local community and voluntary life – can much help improve 
environmental performance. A variable for generic associative activity is not found to be 
significant as a determinant of either environmental governance or effectiveness in 
responding to natural disasters, while it is strongly negatively associated with 
improvements in reducing carbon intensity over the decade 1995-2005. Rather, the social 
institutions that policymakers should seek to transform concern generic, cross-cutting ties 
such as the empowerment of women, improving interethnic relations or development of 
(political) civil society. Again, the suggested policy outcomes would include gender 
development, and support for projects aiming at the strengthening of civil society and the 
cooperation of different ethnic or religious groups, such as by sponsoring truth and 
reconciliation programs in post-conflict states where such institutions exist, or the judicial 
system in countries where post-conflict restitution of injustices remains incomplete.  
 
Finally, as a recurring finding is the positive effect of gender equity upon environmental 
performance, whether measured in terms of disaster response, indices of environmental 
governance, or reductions in carbon emissions relative to GDP. While the causality 
behind this relationship may be different in each case, this suggests in important role for 
women in the effort to achieve comprehensive responses to climate change mitigation 
and adaptation challenges.
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  28Appendix 1.  Data Definitions and Sources 
 
Civic Activism  A composite index measuring the extent to which social practices 
encourage a more active and critical interaction with political authorities. 
For this cluster, 31 items have been taken from 8 independent sources, 
yielding sufficient data to rate 181 separate countries: the average number 




A composite index measuring the extent of social conflicts among ethnic, 
religious, or other social identity groups. For this cluster, 21 items have 
been taken from 9 independent sources, yielding sufficient data to rate 
159 separate countries: the average number of items per country rated is 




A composite index measuring the level of engagement in local 
associations and networks. For this cluster, 41 items have been taken from 
5 independent sources, yielding sufficient data to rate 87 separate 
countries: the average number of items per country rated is 17.3. (Source: 
World Bank, 2008). 
 
Interpersonal 
Safety and Trust 
A composite index measuring the level of general social trust. Included in 
this subindex are data on citizens’ trust in their society, neighbors, and 
community, together with data on crime victimization and estimates of 
homicide and other forms of general interpersonal aggression. For this 
cluster, 41 items have been taken from 11 independent sources, yielding 
sufficient data to rate 158 separate countries: the average number of items 
per country rated is 12.9. 
 
Gender Equity  A composite index measuring the level of discrimination against women. 
For this cluster, 24 items have been taken from 6 independent sources, 
yielding sufficient data to rate 185 separate countries: the average number 
of items per country is 12.5. (Source: World Bank, 2008). 
 
DISASTERS  Number of drought, earthquake, extreme temperature, flood, wave/surge, 
wild fire, and wind storm disaster events, 1995-2005. (Source: Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters). 
 
DEATH  The natural logarithm of the rate of deaths from drought, earthquake, 
extreme temperature, flood, wave/surge, wild fires, and wind storms, over 
the period from 1995 to 2005 inclusive (source: Centre for Research on 
the Epidemiology of Disasters). 
 
ESI  Environmental Policy Index for 2005.  The ESI is a composite index of 
environmental measures compiled by the Centre for International Earth 
Science Information Network (CIESIN) at Colombia University in 
collaboration with the World Economic Forum. (Source 
  29www.yale.edu/esi/). 
 
EPI  The Environmental Performance Index (EPI) is a method of quantifying 
and numerically benchmarking the environmental performance of a 
country's policies. The EPI was developed by Yale University (Yale 
Center for Environmental Law and Policy) and Columbia University 
(Center for International Earth Science Information Network) in 
collaboration with the World Economic Forum and the Joint Research 
Centre of the European Commission. Indicators used in the EPI are 
grouped into the categories of: environmental burden of disease; water 
pollution; air pollution; biodiversity; productive natural resources; and 
climate change. 
 
GDP  The GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2005, in constant 
2000 US dollars (Source: World Development Indicators, 2008). 
 
INDUST  Industry in value added, as a percentage of GDP. Includes value added in 
mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water and gas (Source: 
World Development Indicators, 2008). 
 
lnPOP  Natural logarithm of total population in 2005 (Source: World 
Development Indicators 2008). 
 
lnPOPDENS  Natural logarithm of population density in 2005. Population density is 
midyear population divided by land area in square kilometres (Source: 






A composite index measuring perceptions of the extent to which a 
country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as 
well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media 




A composite index measuring perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private 




A composite index measuring perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to 
such policies (source: Kaufman, Kraay and Maastruzzi 2008). 
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Appendix 2.  Tables 
 
Table 1.0: Total Deaths from Natural Disaster Events 1995-2005, by Type and by Region 
 
  
Drought Earthquake  Extreme 








             
South Asia  200  103262  10148  24805  52293  38  20033  210779 
Middle East and North Africa  12  33434  97  4230  0  47  234  38054 
OECD (1990 members)  0  5585  72136  889  0  144  4778  83532 
East Asia and Pacific  740  4694  101  24673  176533  324  16316  223381 
Latin America and Caribbean  53  2975  1109  38402  10  72  25461  68082 
Europe and Central Asia  2  20515  4524  1345  0  59  484  26929 
Sub-Saharan Africa  958  76  90  6852  309  67  1435  9787 
             
Total 1965  170541  88205  101196  229145  751  68741  660544 
                          




Table 2.0 Correlation Matrix between Indicators of Social and Governance Institutions 
 

















Effectiveness  1.00            
Control of 
Corruption  0.92 1.00             
Voice and 
Accountability  0.73 0.82 1.00           
Intergroup 
Cohesion  0.57 0.58 0.58 1.00        
Civic Activism  0.73  0.75 0.66 0.44  1.00      
Gender Equity  0.50  0.51  0.60 0.54  0.52  1.00     
Interpersonal 
Safety and Trust  0.62 0.57 0.34 0.26  0.45  0.12  1.00   
Clubs and 
Associations  0.22 0.26 0.18 0.02  0.31 -0.04  0.23  1.00 
 
Note: Pairwise correlation coefficients. Table 3.0: Determinants of the Rate of Deaths from Natural Disasters, 1995-2005 
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Voice and Accountability, 1996  ――  ―― 
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――  0.034 
(0.28) 
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――  2.209* 
(0.847) 
Government Effectiveness, 1996 
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(0.327) 
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Civic Activism, 1995 
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(1.713) 
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Log GDP per capita, 1995 * Disasters 





































                  
Adj. R
2 0.413  0.414  0.407  0.484  0.4  0.439  0.432  0.411  0.435 
N 145  140  76  88  75  150  148  127  144 
Notes: Dependent Variable is per capita deaths from natural disasters (1995-2005), logged. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.1 percent, 1 percent and 5 percent levels respectively (on the basis of a two-tailed test). N denotes the sample size.  Table 4.0: Determinants of the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI)  
 
tes: heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are give parentheses. ***,  and * indicate sig ance at the 0.1 pe , 1 per cent and 
5 per cent levels respectively (on the basis of a two-tailed test). N denotes the sample size. Variable abbreviations are as defined in the text. 
























































































       
R
2  0.55  0.563 0.564 0.537 0.556 
N  108 118  82  115 106 
























































































       
R
2  0.709 0.719  0.72  0.701 0.689 
N 101  111  75  107  98 
Notes: heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.1 per cent, 1 per cent and 
5 per cent levels respectively (on the basis of a two-tailed test). N denotes the sample size. Variable abbreviations are as defined in the text. 
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――  -0.003 
(0.041) 
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N 153  146  80  160  79  159  158  132 
R
2 0.03  0.15  0.19  0.03  0.02  0.04  0.03  0.04 
                
Notes: Dependent Variable is Change in Carbon Intensity (1995-2005), relative to base year (1995) 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.1 percent, 1 percent and 5 percent levels respectively (on the basis of a two-tailed test). N denotes the sample size.  